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EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR SERVANT'S NEGLIGENT
PEDESTRIANISM
A messenger boy, engaged in behalf of the Postal Telegraph Com-
pany, appellee, in the delivery of a telegram, negligently collided with
the appellant on a public sidewalk. Both parties to the accident were
pedestrians. In the appellant's action for personal injuries the trial
court sustained the appellee's demurer on the grounds that the mes-
senger boy used his legs and the public sidewalk in hs own right,
which right was not and could not be delegated to him by the appellee,
and that the doctrine of "respondeat superior" had no application to
such a state of facts. Held, reversed. The applicability of "respondeat
superior" is tested by a determination of whether, at the time of the
injury, the employee is performing some duty within the scope of his
authority.,
By the doctrine of "respondeat superior"'2 a master is liable for
negligent acts3 committed by his agents or servants acting in the
course of employment 4 or the line of duty.5 Realizing that the great
three dissenting judges in this case and Justice Rutledge (who
was of the opinion of the Court in this case), and Justice Reed
(who did not consider this case) held that labor di~putes among
insurance workers are subject to regulation by the National Labor
Relations Board because of the affect on interestate commerce.
Three judges concurring in the Polish Alliance case did so because
they believed insurance to be interstate commerce, and that the
regulation was justifiable because of this. However, the harm
to existing regulation had already been done in the South-Eastern
Underwriters case.
1. Anna L. Annis v. Postal Telegraph Co., - Ind. App. - , 52
N.E. (2d) 373 (1944).
2. Literally translated, "Let the principal answer."
3. It is often said that the master is liable whether the act of the
servant be negligent or willful and wanton. See Ah.bama Power
Co. v. Bodine, 213 Ala. 627, 105 So. 869, 870 (1925).
4. See Restatement, "Agency" (1933) § 228, where it is said that the
conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment, if (a) it
is the kind he is employed to perform, (b) it occurs substantially
within the authorized time and space limits and (c) ik is actuated,
at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master. E'ee also Note(1943) 4 Ga. B. J. 45. However, it should be noted that the exact
meamng of an "act within the scope of employment" has always
been a mooted question.
5. This is the usual statement of the rule of "respondeat superior."
See Illinois Central R.R. et al. v. Hawkins, Administratrix, 66 Iad.
App. 312, 317, 318, 115 N.E. 613, 614 (1917). The Kentucky Su-
preme Court aptly states the reason for the doctrine as one of
public policy and necessity for holding a responsible person liable
for acts done by others in the prosecution of his business, as well
as for placing on employers an incentive to hire only careful em-
ployees. Johnson et al. v. Brewer, 266 Ky. 314, 317, 98 S.W. (2d)
889, 891 (1936). See William F. Barker v. Chicago, Peoria, & St.
Louis Ry., 243 Ill. 482, 488, 90 N.E. 1057, 1059, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1058 (1909); Hantke v. Harris Ice Mach. Works, 152 Ore. 564,
54 P. (2d) 293, 295 (1936). See also Note (1942) 6 Md. L. Rev.
248, 249.
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bulk of modern business is transacted through agency channels, it is
immediately obvious that innumerable fact situations fall within the
ambit of this general rule.6 The breadth of the rule is such that many
limitations and variations in its application are unavoidable.7 In the
principal case the appellees seek to impose another limitaion: i.e., that
the cause of action must be predicated upon the agent's negligent man-
agement of some instrumentality and that no liability adheres to the
principal as a result of its agent's pedestrious negligence.8
Two American decisions, both Missouri cases, directly support the
appellee's contention.9 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, by certain
dicta, has indicated that it would approve of the Missouri opinions.10
The first of the Missouri decisions, Phillips v. Western Union Tele-
graph Company," was decided upon facts substantially identical with
those of the principal case.' 2 The Missouri Supreme Court' 3 concluded
that a master was liable only for those acts of its agents that could be
performed by the use of its powers and under its direction; that the
messenger was traveling upon a public street in the exercise of a public
right which was not subject to control by the defendant, and being
under no duty to regulate the gait of its messengers the defendant
was not liable.' 4 In the second of the Missouri cases," decided fourteen
years later, the Kansas City Court of Appeals, although implying
6. See Mechem, "Outlines of Agency" (3d ed. 1923) § 529.
7. See Neuner, "Respondeat Superior In The Light Of Comparative
Law" (1941) 4 La. L. Rev. 1, 36, 37, who, for example, proclaims
that the "scope of employment" limitation is unreasonable and
that the test should be whether or not the tort was connected with
the work. See also (1938) 32 Ill. L. Rev. 1001.
8. Anna L. Annis v. Postal Telegraph Co., - Ind. App. - , 52
N.E. (2d) 373, 374 (1944), cited supra note 1.
9. Ritchey v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 227 Mo. App. 754, 41
S. W. (2d) 628 (1931), and Phillips v. Western Union Telegraph
Co. et al., 270 Mo. 676, 195 S. W. 711 (1917).
10. John Wesolowski et al v. Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 308
Pa. 117, 162 Atl. 166, 87 A.L.R. 783 (1932).
11. Phillips v. Western" Union Telegraph Co. et al., 270 Mo. 676, 195
S.W. 711 (1917), cited supra note 9.
12. The facts of the Phillips Case were that the plaintiff was stand-
ing on a street corner waiting for an auto to pass; one of the
defendants messengers snatched a newspaper from a news vendor
and while fleeing from the newsboy negligently collided with the
plaintiff, knocking her into the street and seriously injuring her;
at the time of the accident the messenger was delivering a tele-
gram for the defendant.
13. The court sat in bane with Justice Woodson dissenting upon the
grounds that at the time of the accident the messenger was pur-
suing the business of the master and therefore, "... the negligence
in the one is identical with that in the other. . . ." Phillips v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., et al., 270 Mo. 676, 684, 195 S.W.
711, 714 (1917), cited supra note 11.
14. Id. at 680, 195 S.W. at 712, 713.
15. Ritchey v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 227 Mo. App. 754, .41
S.W. (2d) 628 (1931), cited supra note 9.
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doubt as to the logic of the Phillips case,1' cited it as controlling in
Missouri. The Pennsylvania decision' 7 held the defendant insurance
company not liable for injuries resulting from the negligent operation
of an automobile by one of the defendant's collection agents upon the
grounds that responsibility was commensurate with actual or inferable
control of the instrumentality causing the injury."8 As illustrative of
their reasoning the court said, "If Adams [the collection agent] had
chosen to walk from person to person with whom he had his em-
ployer's business to transact, and in walking he had negligently knock-
ed over and injured another pedestrian, it could not reasonably be con-
tended that his employer should respond in damages. . . . So to hold
would be to construe the phrase 'respondeat superior' be. ond its funda-
mental meaning and to carry its principle to absurd lengths and to
consequences forbidden by every sound consideration of public policy."'1
These three cases stand alone as a minority rule.20
The decision in the principal case aligns Indiana wit4 the majority
doctrine but again there is a noted paucity of authority.2 Two Cali-
fornia opinions 22 and a recent Washington decision 23 give apt expres-
16. Id. at 629, where the court said, "Whether the doctrine of the
Phillips Case is sound or unsound is not for this court; it is con-
trolling, notwithstanding holdings in other jurisdictions to the
contrary." Contra: Phillips v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 194
Mo. App. 458, 184 S.W. 958 (1916), where, upon th~e facts of the
Phillips case cited in note 11 supra, the husband recovered for the
loss of his wife's services. See Salmons v. Dunn & Bradstreet,
349 Mo. 498, 508, 162 S. W. (2d) 245, 250 (1942).
17. John Wesolowski et al. v. Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 308
Pa. 117, 162 AtI. 166 (1932), cited supra note 10.
18. Id. at 168.
19. Id at 167.
20. See Salmons v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 349 Mo. 498, 508, 162 S.W. (2d)
245, 250 (1942), where the Missouri Supreme Court said, "Our
research does not support the notion that the Phillips case had
been overruled by implication, but it does reveal that the case
stands alone, except for Ritchey v. Western Union." In the prin-
cipal case counsel for the appellee's have cited Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. Bonnell, 218 Ind. 607, 611, 33 N.E. (2d) 980, 981
(1941), for the proposition that an employer is not liable for the
injurious consequences of the acts of the servant if by reasonable
prudence the employer could not have forseen or prevented the act
causing the injury. However, in the Bonnell case, the court said
that there was no evidence to support an inference that the em-
ployee was acting within the scope of his employment, while in
the principal case it was not contended that the rmessenger was
acting outside the scope of his employment. Upon these facts the
cases seem clearly distinguishable.
21. See 47 L. R. A. (N.S.) 143 (1914), where it is suggested that a
probable reason for the sparsity of this type of case is that the
injury is usually so slight that there is no effort to recover, or
the contact is of such a character that the third person bases his
action upon an assault wilful in its character rather than upon
negligence.
22. Schediwy v. McDermott et al., 113 Cal. App. 218, 298 Pac. 107
( 1931); Tighe v. Ad Chong et al, 44 Cal. App. (2d) 164, 112 P.
2d) 20 (1941).
23. Hobba et ux. v. Postal Telegraph Co., - Wash. - , 141 P.
(2d) 648 (1943).
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sion to this view.24 Five other cases give support to the majority.25
"Respondeat superior" is commonly said to be founded upon the
policy, ". . that every man, in the management of his own affairs,
whether by himself or by his agents or servants, shall so conduct them
as not to injure another; and if he does not, and another thereby sus-
tains damage, he shall answer for it."126 It is submitted that it is dif-
ficult to see why the absence of an instrumentality should delimit this
policy.2 7 The logic of the case seems undisputable.
MASTER AND SERVANT
"PORTAL TO PORTAL" TIME CONSTITUTES WORK UNDER THE
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT.
Plaintiff iron ore company brought action against the defendant
miners' union for a declaratory judgment that miners' travel time, (a)
in the shafts, (b) getting to and from the actual face of the iron ore,
and (c) time spent at the surface in obtaining and returning tools,
checking in and out etc., should not be counted in the work week as
24. In Tighe v. Ad Chong et al., 44 Cal. App. (2d) 164, 112 P. (2d)
20 (1941), cited supra note 22, where a delivery boy negligently
bumped into and injured the plaintiff, the California Supreme
Court, in disavowing the principle of the Missouri cases and fol-
lowing the Schediwy case, held that the negligent operation of
some instrumentality was not essential in invoking "respondeat
superior." "Quite to the contrary, the law is well settled that in
determining the question of respondeat superior the real test to
be applied is whether at the time the employee commits the
negligent act resulting in the injuries to the third person, he is
engaged in performing some duty within the scope of his em-
ployment." Id. at 22. However, it should be noted that the court
attempts to distinguish the Missouri cases upon the grounds that
in those cases the injury was the result of "rollicking" by the
servant. In Hobba et ux. v. Postal Telegraph Co., - Wash. - ,
141 P. (2d) 648 (1943), cited supra note 23, where the facts were
very similar to those of the Phillips case, the Washington Supreme
Court said that you would probably feel that you should make some
distinction between those cases where the employee uses some in-
strumentality and where the employee travels on foot. However,
the court continued by saying, "If the employer chooses to have
the work done by another, he must be held responsible to others
for the negligent conduct of his employee while doing the work,
or else he should do the work himself. We think that if we try
to draw a distinction between the different methods of locomotion
that might result in injury to others, we not only misapply the
doctrine of respondeat superior, but also forsake it entirely." Id.
at 651.
25. See Cook v. Sanger, 110 Cal. App. 293, 293 Pac. 794, 800 (1930);
Phillip Ryan v. Patrick F. Keane, 211 Mass. 543, 98 N. E. 590
(1912); Phillips v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 194 Mo. App. 458,
184 S. W. 958 (1916); Price v. Simon, 62 N.J.L. 151, 40 Atl. 689(1898); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Edwards, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 184,
67 S. W. 891 (1902). See also (1944) 32 Geo. L. J. 308.
26. Nicholas Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R. R., 4 Metc. 49, 55, 56
(Mass. 1842).
27. See (1944) 32 Geo. L. J. 308.
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